This study analyzes the distribution of investment horizons in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholders in one no-load mutual fund family. A proportional hazards model shows that there are observable shareholder characteristics that enable the fund to predict reliably on the day each account is opened whether the account will be short-term or long-term. Simulations show that the liquidity costs imposed on the fund by the expected short-term shareholders are signi¯cantly greater than those imposed by the expected long-term shareholders. Combining these results, the analysis argues that mutual funds do not provide equitable liquidity-risk insurance.
Investors ostensibly receive no-or low-cost liquidity from open-end mutual funds. However, their trades in fund shares may force the fund to make costly transactions in its portfolio. Because the fund pays these expenses, shareholders who trade implicitly impose the¯nancial burden of their liquidity demands onto others in the fund. If shareholders di®erentially generate fund-level costs, there will be a wealth transfer from the low-cost shareholders to the high-cost shareholders. The purpose of this article is to explore shareholders' demanded liquidity and its pricing in open-end mutual funds. The¯rst part of the inquiry asks whether shareholders' liquidity demands can be predicted. The second part examines whether shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is proportional to the liquidity costs they bear in the fund.
The empirical analysis is based on a proprietary database that includes a panel of all shareholder transactions within and across all funds in one no-load mutual fund family between 1994 and 2000. The shareholders' liquidity transactions are one of four types: open an account, buy additional shares, sell some shares, or sell all shares (i.e., close the account). Johnson (2002) documents that most of these shareholders make no transaction between account opening and closing. Moreover, he shows that those who do trade tend to make transactions that are small relative to the account-opening purchase. This suggests that their liquidity needs are primarily revealed by their investment horizons. Hence, predicting liquidity needs of existing fund shareholders reduces to predicting account closures.
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The empirical investigation proceeds in two stages. First, it applies a duration model to the data. Results show that the fund can predict shareholder investment horizons using data it ordinarily collects when accounts are opened.
2 This¯nding is robust to data that are collected after account opening, including subsequent fund returns. The second stage of the analysis splits the shareholders into two ex ante groups and measures the liquidity demands of each group. Results show that their annual liquidity needs are signi¯cantly di®erent.
In other words, the shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is not proportional to the liquidity costs they bear in the fund.
Combining the two main results, this study argues that the long-term shareholders pay for more liquidity than they demand. Similarly, the short-term shareholders pay for less liquidity than they demand. The resulting wealth transfer is noteworthy because it is predictable to the extent expected investment horizons 1 are observable.
A narrow interpretation of this article is that it shows that mutual funds misprice their shares because shareholders do not pay for the costs their trades impose on the fund. This result contributes to the literature that examines the structure of the mutual fund as an investment vehicle for heterogeneous shareholders.
Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000) demonstrate that shareholder°ows negatively a®ect mutual funds' aftertax returns. Other articles discuss non-synchronous trading and identify ine±ciencies in the industry's convention of pricing mutual funds using the underlying assets' last trades even when those last trades were executed hours or days earlier. Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001) show that this mispricing can be pro¯tably exploited in domestic equity funds. Goetzmann, Ivkovi ¶ c, and Rouwenhorst (2001) and Greene and Hodges (2002) document a similar result in international equity funds. Taken together, this is growing evidence of economically signi¯cant pooling externalities in mutual funds.
A broad reading of this article suggests that it has far-reaching implications if the main results generalize to other¯nancial intermediaries that are thought to add value by insuring against some risk through the pooling of homogeneous agents. One example of insurance-through-pooling intermediation is found in the seminal investment model developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
3 Investors are risk averse and do not know whether they will redeem early or late. Investors bear liquidity risk if they invest directly:
early redeemers receive a low return and late redeemers receive a high return. The¯nancial intermediary (called a bank) insures against this risk through an ex post wealth transfer from the long-term investors to the short-term investors. Thus, early redeemers have higher ex post utility if they choose the¯nancial intermediary, and late redeemers have higher ex post utility if they choose to invest directly. Nevertheless, on an ex ante basis, all shareholders prefer the¯nancial intermediary because investment horizons|and hence wealth transfers|cannot be predicted. If¯nancial intermediaries contain predictable investment horizons and wealth transfers among their investors, theorists will need to revisit the question of how¯nancial intermediaries add value. In any case, the following analysis suggests that mutual funds are not Diamond-Dybvig liquidity providers, contradicting the Chordia (1996) and Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) models of mutual fund investment.
A second example of how lessons from this research may extend to other¯nancial contracts that provide insurance is found in the mortgage-backed securities literature. 4 These securities insure against prepayment risk|the risk that mortgagors will exercise their prepayment options|by transferring it to all investors in the mortgage pool. Valuation studies suggest that these pools contain mortgagors with heterogeneous prepayment risk. 5 While it is well understood that observable holding period heterogeneity a®ects the value of the pool in the secondary market, an overlooked corollary suggested by this study is that it could a®ect mortgage prices in the primary market. If lenders could screen prepayment risk (or borrowers could credibly signal their risk), they could charge lower interest rates to low-risk borrowers and higher interest rates to high-risk borrowers.
The remainder of this discussion is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the model of mutual fund trade and the resulting wealth transfer. Section II describes the data. Sections III and IV study investment horizons in the context of single-spell, semi-parametric duration models. Section V estimates three measures of costs generated by shareholders' trades. The analysis concludes with a discussion of the wealth transfer in Section VI and a summary of the main results and major implications in Section VII.
I. Model
An overlapping generations model motivates this study. The model's essential intuition is outlined in this section; the formal model appears in the Appendix.
The economy contains mutual funds that are endowed with the same constant-returns-to-scale investment technology that enables them to generate identical returns each period. The funds do not charge shareholders any kind of fee to trade fund shares. Nevertheless, funds must pay to trade their underlying assets whenever their shareholders sell fund shares. Each fund's return is reduced, therefore, whenever any of its shareholders sells shares.
There are two types of shareholders, each investing for two periods. The¯rst type must pay a dissipative switching fee to change funds after one period. These investors will choose to remain in the same fund both periods if the fee is large enough. The second type does not pay a switching fee to change funds. These investors will choose to change funds after one period if another fund o®ers a marginally higher return in the next period.
The economic basis for the switching-fee heterogeneity can be motivated several ways. The model has a unique separating equilibrium (see Theorem 1) in which the zero-switching-cost investors change funds after one period and the high-switching-cost investors do not. The essential intuition behind the equilibrium is that shareholder-level redemptions decrease fund returns, driving a wedge between the return of funds that have high redemption rates and those that have low redemption rates. This wedge will make the zero-switching-cost shareholders opportunistically switch to funds with low redemption rates. The high-switching-cost investors recognize that their return is lower than the traders' return, but they refrain from trade because their switching cost is at least as large as the trading gain.
Sections III{V test two implications of the model. The¯rst is that switching-cost di®erences are associated with investment horizon di®erences. The second is that investment horizon di®erences cause a wealth transfer from long-term to short-term shareholders.
II. Data
The data for this research were supplied, generously, by an anonymous mutual fund family. The family is an open-end, no-load complex with fees and trading restrictions that are standard in the industry. It 4 consists of approximately ten funds, including both equity and¯xed-income funds. The equity funds tend not to hold large-cap securities and are thus di®erent from the typical fund (see Falkenstein (1996) The unit of observation throughout the analysis is the account and not, for example, the shareholder or the invested dollar. Thus, the fact that a particular shareholder might hold multiple funds, might hold the same fund multiple times (for example, in both taxable and tax-advantaged accounts), and might repeatedly reregister the investment (for example, a newly-married shareholder might reregister an individual account as a joint account) is ignored; each account is treated as if it were independent. In practice, few shareholders seem to have multiple registrations, although there is a handful of accounts that has been reregistered ten or more times. \Investor" and \shareholder" are hereafter used to mean \account."
All¯xed-income accounts are excluded from the analysis because they may be traded di®erently from the equity accounts. All accounts opened before fall 1994 are dropped because data about transactions and account closures that occurred during that period are unavailable. Account options such as telephone redemption privileges are e®ective as of the earlier of the account closing date or summer 2000; the analysis assumes that the observed options were set at account opening.
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A. Fund Distribution
The industry assigns social codes to accounts. A few examples of the scores of social codes used by this family are joint tenants with rights of survivorship, partnership, corporate¯duciary, omnibus house, Roth conversion, uniform gifts to minors, dealer, and trust. Some of these codes exist as check-o® boxes on the application while others are assigned by the transfer agent after it reviews the application and all supporting materials. Protocols for assigning social codes are encapsulated in a written document that is used by employees of the transfer agent making the assignment. Rigorous internal quality-control checks further ensure the consistency of these data across time and across employees.
All accounts are grouped into eight distribution channels based on their social codes for this study: Retail [[PUT 
III. Closure Risk Estimated at Account Opening
This section applies a single-spell, semi-parametric proportional hazards model to estimate closure risk.
Regressors|usually called covariates in the duration literature|are restricted to data collected by the fund on the day each account opens. Section IV adds data collected after account opening, including subsequent trades made by shareholders and fund returns.
The primary function of interest in the duration model is the hazard function¸(t). It represents, loosely speaking, the conditional account-closure rate at event time t. Letting the random variable T be the length of time a mutual fund account is open, the hazard function can be expressed as follows:
Although the hazard function can be parametrically speci¯ed, there is little economic theory to suggest an appropriate speci¯cation for the mutual fund account-closure process. Erring on the side of caution, therefore, the proportional hazards model developed by Cox (1975) is selected for the analysis. In this semi-parametric model, the hazard function is speci¯ed as follows:
where t is measured in calendar days and z is a vector of regressors that are hypothesized to a®ect the distribution of fund holding periods. The empirical analysis estimates¯while allowing¸0 to vary freely.
An important feature of the Cox model is that the hazard function¸equals the baseline hazard¸0 when z = 0. Thus, if the regressors are carefully de¯ned so that z = 0 for the \average" account, the baseline hazard can be interpreted as the hazard of the average or baseline account. All other e®ects are interpreted relative to this baseline using the hazard ratio e¯i = (e¯i¸0)=(e 0¸0 ). If the hazard ratio is greater than one, the account is called risky because it is associated with higher closure risk than that of the average account.
Similarly, if the hazard ratio is less than one, the account is called safe because it is associated with lower closure risk than that of the average account. For example, if the coe±cient associated with the indicator variable z i were¯i = 0:6514, accounts possessing that characteristic are risky: they are e 0:6514 ¡ 1 = 91:8% more likely to close than the baseline account is. The estimated coe±cients¯i are not of direct interest and are not reported.
It is di±cult to make strong statements about economic signi¯cance in the proportional hazards model.
Unreported results show that marginal e®ects greater than 7.53% in absolute value alter the investment advisor's discounted future pro¯t by 1%. Therefore, the analysis focuses on hazard ratios from indicator variables that are outside the interval (0:9247; 1:0753) and that are statistically signi¯cant at ® = 5%.
A. Speci¯cation
The empirical speci¯cation of mutual fund closure risk is motivated by the switching-cost model: fund holding period is a function of shareholder type and fund performance. Six classes of variables are hypothesized to proxy for the shareholder's switching costs and other economic factors: time, performance, fund, shareholder characteristics, account options, and distribution channel. These six groups collectively contribute more than one hundred variables collected at account opening to the regression. Continuous variables are recast as dummy variables because they are easier to interpret in the Cox model.
The time dummies capture opening month (69 dummies), calendar month (12), and day of the week (5) e®ects. The performance dummies indicate whether the fund's raw return exceeded its benchmark index or an alternative index in the past week, month, or quarter (6). The third group consists of dummies for each of the funds. The fourth type of regressors summarizes shareholder characteristics: shareholder age (10), size of¯rst transaction (6), investment advisor employee status (1) , and state of residence (7). The¯fth type of regressors describes options chosen by the shareholder at account opening: automatic investment or withdrawal plan participation (1), whether the initial transaction was made with a check (1), whether dividends are reinvested (1), and the selected level of telephone trading privileges (4). The¯nal type of dummy variables indicates the distribution channel through which fund shares are purchased (8).
The closure risk model for shareholder i who opens an account in fund j at time t is the log-linear version of equation 1: log¸(t; z i;j ;¯;¸0) = (time) t¯1 + (performance) j¯2
Three empirical speci¯cations of this equation are presented in the next subsection: both¯5 and¯6 are constrained to equal the zero vector; only¯6 is constrained to equal the zero vector; neither¯5 nor¯6 are constrained.
All data used in these speci¯cations are collected by the fund when the account is opened. Variables are measured so that the baseline shareholder (z = 0) is not an employee of the fund, does not live in one of the six largest states or the state of the investment advisor, is between 40 and 50 years old, and paid for the initial transaction using a check. The initial deposit was between one-half and one times the fund's minimum and was transacted on a Monday in December 1994. The account comes through the Retail Taxable channel, reinvests dividends, does not have telephone trading privileges, and has neither an automatic investment nor disinvestment plan.
The parameters¯1,¯2, and¯3 are each expected to di®er from the zero vector because of the evidence that fund°ows are sensitive to fund returns at both the aggregate level (Sirri and Tufano (1998 ), Warther (1995 ), and Zheng (1999 ) and investor level (Goetzmann and Massa (2002) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) ). Additionally,¯4 is expected to di®er from the zero vector because demographics have been shown to a®ect investors' trades (Ameriks and Zeldes (2001)).
Controlling for these four classes of variables, this section tests the hypothesis that¯5 and¯6 are equal to the zero vector. Distribution channels (¯6) could be related to investment horizons for two di®erent reasons.
(A similar discussion applies to account options (¯5).) First, there may be treatment e®ects: shareholders that happen to be in a low-cost trading channel choose high levels of trade simply because trades are cheap.
Second, there may be selection e®ects: shareholders with a priori preferences for high levels of trade will self-select into a low-cost trading channel. Under either interpretation, the fact that distribution channels predict duration is su±cient to show that market segmentation is possible, ceteris paribus. In order to simplify the discussion of the following empirical results, the selection e®ect interpretation is taken below.
B. Results
Table IV presents the estimation results from three speci¯cations of equation 2 using the popular Breslow approximation for failure-time ties and robust standard errors. Only results from the third speci¯cation are discussed.
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The age baseline (from the omitted dummy) is the group of shareholders between 40 and 50 years old.
Accounts that indicate no age have a hazard ratio of 1.26: their conditional closure risk is 26% larger than the risk for shareholders in their forties. Apart from the twenty-year-old shareholders who are 10% riskier than the baseline, all shareholders under age 50 have similar closure risk. Seventy-year-old shareholders have the largest hazard ratio at 1.66. This can be interpreted as evidence of changing switching costs across cohorts: those with the highest costs may be preoccupied with their careers and families (Age 30 and Age 40) while those with the lowest cost may have more free time (Age 70). A life-cycle or consumption story is also possible. For example,¯nance professionals frequently advise clients to hold more bonds toward the end of the life-cycle as the clients shift from saving assets to consuming assets. The evidence is broadly consistent with this advice and with some related models of portfolio theory as discussed in Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) . Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) provide an excellent introduction to this topic.
The second group of hazard ratios comes from account size dummies. The baseline account deposited between one-half and one times the fund's minimum. Results show that the smallest accounts are not signi¯cantly di®erent from the baseline, but larger accounts are uniformly shorter-term. The largest accounts are 63% riskier than the baseline. These e®ects are consistent with the model: the smaller shareholder has higher switching costs because he has fewer alternatives, a smaller incentive to monitor the account, or has less trading experience.
The transfer agent keep track of shareholders who are either fund employees or relatives of fund employees.
The regressions show that fund employees' accounts are signi¯cantly longer-term.
Mutual funds are required to record the state of residence for every purchaser of fund shares under blue sky laws. The seven largest states for share purchases are assigned dummy variables. The investment advisor's home state is specially coded as \Headquarters" and the other six are coded as \State 1" { \State Most accounts (96%) reinvest dividends. Those that do not reinvest dividends have a hazard ratio that is 33% higher than the baseline. This e®ect is statistically and economically signi¯cant after controlling for other variables|such as age|that might be correlated with the need for dividends.
Accounts may have telephone exchange privileges, redemption privileges, both, or none (omitted). Accounts that select some form of telephone privileges are signi¯cantly riskier than those that do not.
The account option results have practical implications for the investment advisor. Mutual funds are increasingly o®ering options that simplify the trading process, including telephone and Internet trading technologies. Lowering shareholders' trading costs might be rational business strategy if shareholder type were exogenously determined (i.e., if there were a selection e®ect). However, this might not be wise if trading preferences were endogenously determined based on the options provided by the fund (i.e., if there were a treatment e®ect): low costs will encourage short investment horizons. In either case, the long-term social welfare implications of lower switching costs are not clear. On the one hand, shareholders may move assets to funds that deliver excess returns, e±ciently reallocating capital (see Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) ).
On the other hand, they may transfer assets to funds that achieved high recent returns by chance, imposing socially wasteful transaction costs on the economy (see Theorem 3 in the Appendix).
The¯nal group of regressors consists of the eight distribution channel dummies. Retail Taxable is the omitted channel in the regression because it has the largest number of accounts. Entity and Other accounts have durations that are statistically indistinguishable from the baseline account. Fund/SERV accounts are 92% riskier than the baseline; these shareholders have economically and statistically shorter investment horizons. Trusts are 10% riskier than the baseline. The Retail Tax-free accounts are nearly 15% safer than the Retail Taxable accounts. This is consistent with folk wisdom in the industry, but inconsistent with the tax advantages of realizing capital gains inside tax-free accounts. Minor accounts are 39% safer than the baseline.
The marginally signi¯cant coe±cient on Supermarket is ignored. Although no¯rm that had an omnibus relationship with the family terminated it, there were several instances of account reregistration. Thus, the 13 closures that exist in this category are in some sense arti¯cial. These reregistrations are not excluded from the database because similar reregistrations exist in the other channels. Dropping these accounts does not materially change the results.
It is important to understand that the fund chooses the type of its shareholders when it chooses its distribution channels. For example, the fund chooses whether or not to have risky shareholders by choosing whether or not to participate in the Fund/SERV and Supermarket channels. Simulations in Section V quantify the costs of pooling predictably heterogeneous shareholders.
Although many of the above-mentioned individual coe±cients are economically and statistically signi¯-cant, the univariate e®ects do not capture the full range of redemption risk. Suppose, for example, that a thirty-¯ve year-old shareholder opens a Retail Tax-free account with a check at the fund's minimum, reinvests dividends, does not authorize telephone privileges, and establishes an automatic investment plan. This account is 19% safer than the baseline account:
Were this shareholder also a resident of State 6 (Headquarters), the account would be 23% (42%) safer than the baseline account. In contrast, a Retail Taxable account opened by a seventy-¯ve year old depositinḡ fty-times the fund's minimum by wire and choosing full telephone privileges while not reinvesting dividends is 606% riskier than the baseline account. These multivariate e®ects appear to be large enough to concern regulators, the investment advisor, and the fund's other shareholders.
The unreported fund and time e®ects were qualitatively similar across speci¯cations. However, the dayof-the-week e®ect changes with the controls for shareholder type. Monday accounts are signi¯cantly safer and Wednesday accounts are signi¯cantly riskier in the¯rst two reported speci¯cations. In the¯nal reported speci¯cation|after controlling for shareholder type|only a marginally signi¯cant Wednesday e®ect remains. This is consistent with Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) who¯nd that unsophisticated individuals transact on Mondays while sophisticated institutions transact on Wednesdays.
14 In summary, many of the regressors analyzed in this section are economically and statistically signi¯cant predictors of investment horizons. The directions of these e®ects are consistent with the switching-cost model. Some of the largest e®ects come from the fund-delivery mechanism, suggesting that the fund could dramatically decrease its redemption rate were it to stop distributing shares to predictably risky investors.
IV. Closure Risk Estimated after Account Opening
The previous section uses data that are collected by the fund when accounts are opened to show that the fund can predict shareholder investment horizons. This section extends the analysis by incorporating information about the shareholder's trades, account performance, and fund performance after account opening.
This robustness exercise strengthens the previous results.
A. Restructured Database
The database is restructured by splitting each account into 30-day observations. Regressors are assumed constant within each 30-day interval, but they are allowed to change between intervals. Thirty days is arbitrarily chosen as a base unit of time; choosing a 91-day interval does not materially change the results. The second category of new regressors measures fund performance using two di®erent yardsticks: fund return and account return. 
B. Results
Table VII presents four speci¯cations of time-varying closure risk. The popular Breslow approximation for failure-time ties is again used, but non-robust standard errors are reported because robust standard errors are not computationally feasible in this larger data set. The results are discussed in terms of the fourth speci¯cation that includes all time-varying regressors. The hazard ratios for shareholder age, account size, employee status, and state of residence are not reported because they are similar to those presented in Table IV .
[[PUT However, the e®ect of the¯rst redemption in the account (Recent Sell and Ever Sell are both equal to one)
is to increase the closure risk by 1:517 £ 1:520 ¡ 1 = 131%:
Closure risk is reduced by both recent purchases (34%) and the¯rst purchase in the account (1 ¡ 0:659 £ 1:035 = 32%). However, closure risk is higher in accounts that have made a purchase but not recently (Ever Buy is one and Recent Buy is zero): they are 3.5% more likely than the baseline account to close. This e®ect is not economically signi¯cant, but it is consistent with the switching-cost model: having revealed their low switching costs, ever-bought shareholders are more likely to trade.
The second group of new variables is less important than the¯rst. The estimated hazard ratio for thē rst lag of fund returns is 0:992. A ten percent increase in last-period annualized, average fund performance (which also increases account returns) decreases closure risk by 10 £ (1 ¡ :992 £ 1:006) = 2%. The e®ect of the second lag is to decrease closure risk by about the same 2%. Curiously, after controlling for recent fund returns, positive account returns increase closure risk: a 10% increase in account returns more than two months previous raises risk by 6%.
The hazard ratios of the other regressors of interest are qualitatively unchanged in this model, except that the automatic investment plan is now economically signi¯cant. Importantly, the channel e®ects remain economically and statistically signi¯cant.
In summary, this section shows that although trades made after account opening, fund returns, and account returns a®ect closure risk, other data available at the account's opening generally have larger e®ects.
In particular, distribution channel e®ects are larger than the e®ects of most other variables of interest, including fund returns. Because regressors that predict duration are collected by the investment advisor when the shareholder¯rst joins the fund, it is clear that mutual funds do not pool homogeneous shareholders to insure against liquidity risk as suggested by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) ; Chordia (1996); Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000); and others. One puzzle raised by this study is why funds choose to pool observably di®erent shareholders.
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V. Cost Estimates
The previous two sections document that shareholders in one mutual fund family have predictably different liquidity needs. This section measures whether the shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is proportional to the liquidity costs they bear in the fund.
The fund incurs liquidity costs as investors trade its shares. Five components of these costs are outlined as follows. Second, shareholder°ows may force the fund to trade at inopportune times. Edelen (1999) argues that the fund will earn positive risk-adjusted returns when the portfolio manager trades on private information. He predicts, however, that the fund will incur losses when the portfolio manager trades to satisfy shareholders' liquidity needs.
Third, shareholder°ows will make the fund deviate from its preferred portfolio weights. Purchases will result in excess cash in the fund's portfolio; redemptions have the opposite e®ect. Even after the°ow is fully traded, there may be tracking error if the°ow was not large enough to be traded across each of the fund's assets. The other side of the coin is that shareholder°ows allow a misaligned portfolio to be rebalanced more cheaply than if there were no°ows. In the case of net in°ows, for example, underweighted assets could be purchased without the sale of overweighted assets.
Fourth, shareholder°ows may alter the type of securities placed in the fund's portfolio. Chordia (1996) provides evidence that mutual funds hold more liquid assets when there is more uncertainty about shareholder redemptions. For example, closed-end funds' portfolios may contain more illiquid assets than open-end funds' portfolios contain because closed-end funds do not need to sell assets to satisfy shareholder redemptions.
Last, shareholder°ows may change the fund's distributions. This will a®ect the return obtained by taxable shareholders. On the one hand, their tax burden will increase if net out°ows force the portfolio manager to sell appreciated assets because the fund is required to pass through gains to its shareholders proportionately. On the other hand, their tax burden will decrease if net in°ows dilute the fund's realized and unrealized capital gains through the creation of new shares. Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000) report that this tax externality may have cost shareholders more than 10 bp per month between 1983 and 1998.
A comprehensive analysis of these¯ve costs is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, data required to measure precisely these costs are unavailable. For example, the tax basis of the fund's portfolio must be known before the tax e®ect can be measured accurately. For these reasons, the liquidity cost estimates presented in this section are entirely based on Jones-Lipson transaction costs and Edelen uninformed trading costs. This necessary simpli¯cation suggests that the reported estimates will understate the total costs shareholder°ows impose on the fund.
A. Results
The fund's technology enables it to generate a particular series of returns. As shareholders trade fund shares, however, the fund will make extra trades and incur extra costs. Thus, the post-shareholder-°ow fund returns will be inferior to the pre-shareholder-°ow fund returns. The di®erence between these returns is the fund's cost of liquidity provision. Formally, fund j's liquidity cost at time t is the geometric di®erence between the cumulative pre-°ow fund return and the cumulative post-°ow fund return: liquidity cost j;t = log µ cumulative pre-°ow fund return j;t cumulative post-°ow fund return j;t ¶ ;
where the cumulative returns are normalized to one when the fund enters the sample. The liquidity cost is annualized and averaged across all funds in the family. The di®erence between indirect and direct shareholders' average liquidity cost is the liquidity di®erence:
liquidity di®erence = liquidity cost indirect ¡ liquidity cost direct :
This statistic will be zero if there are no wealth transfers between the indirect and direct shareholders. The di®erence between the fund's liquidity cost and that of one shareholder type is the pooling cost:
pooling cost type = liquidity cost fund ¡ liquidity cost type ;
where \type" is either indirect or direct. This statistic estimates how much a shareholder type loses (or gains, if negative) in the pooled fund.
Note that the liquidity cost statistic is a®ected by the ratio of shareholder°ows to fund assets. For example, $10,000 in transaction costs is more signi¯cant on a per-invested-dollar basis in a $5 million fund than in a $500 million fund. Thus, funds with high percentage°ows (for example, rapidly growing funds) incur high liquidity costs. Nevertheless, the liquidity di®erence statistic is not a®ected by fund growth if the indirect and direct growth rates are equal: the liquidity di®erence statistic is zero if both indirect and direct assets grow at the same rate. The key observation necessary to see this is that liquidity costs associated with a given percentage in°ow will be the same for both indirect and direct shareholders because liquidity costs are stated as percentages. holder°ows over an accumulation period before trading them. This approach corresponds more closely with the intuition that net (not gross) shareholder°ows cause the fund to trade. However, this methodology is sensitive to assumptions about the fund's cash management strategy. For example, trading costs will depend on the number of days the fund accumulates°ows before it trades them. Additionally, the fund's return during the accumulation period will depend on how the accumulated cash is held. For example, non-interest bearing cash will behave di®erently from S&P 500 futures contracts. These cash management strategies may be especially relevant for funds that have high portfolio turnover and funds that do not track popular indices. For these reasons, Edelen's net-°ow model may be inferior to his gross-°ow model. Nevertheless, a net-°ow model, too, is estimated.
The¯nal input in the liquidity cost model is shareholder°ows. To simplify the analysis, account-level transactions are aggregated into daily gross°ows from three types of shareholders: direct (accounts opened through the transfer agent), indirect (accounts opened through an intermediary), and all (the sum of indirect and direct). Results from Sections III and IV suggest that direct shareholders' liquidity cost will be less than indirect shareholders' liquidity cost.
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The gross-°ow model is presented in Panel A of Since the liquidity cost imposed on the fund by the indirect shareholders is higher than that imposed by the direct shareholders, it appears that the fund's return would have been higher had the fund excluded the costly indirect shareholders. The direct shareholders' estimated pooling cost is 51 bp, suggesting that an otherwise identical direct-only fund would outperform the pooled fund by 51 bp annually. 
B. Robustness Checks
The liquidity cost model has four inputs. Table VIII shows that the results are driven by neither assumptions of trading costs (Jones and Lipson (2001) ) nor assumptions about the fund's response to shareholder°o ws (Edelen (1999)). It is worthwhile to consider brie°y the model's sensitivities to the other two inputs because they are unique to the mutual fund family that provided the data.
The¯rst family-speci¯c input is daily fund returns. The gross-°ow model is reestimated with three sequences of random returns. The¯rst sequence is normally distributed with the same mean and standard deviation as the family's returns. The second sequence is normally distributed with mean and standard deviation equal to that of the value-weighted stock market between 1994 and 2000, the sample period. The third sequence is normally distributed with mean and standard deviation equal to that of the value-weighted stock market between 1962 and 2000. In each case, the unreported results are similar to those presented in are economically large.
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In summary, this section explores liquidity costs generated and borne by fund shareholders, focusing on two easy-to-identify groups of shareholders (namely, indirect and direct) that have di®erent predicted liquidity needs. Even though these shareholders bear the same daily costs in the pooled fund, their annual liquidity needs di®er in the basic, scaled, and redemption-only models by 65 bp, 29 bp, and 31 bp, respectively.
In other words, these shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is not proportional to the costs they bear in the fund. In the basic model, for example, direct shareholders annually pay 51 bp more for liquidity in the pooled fund than they would pay in an otherwise identical fund that excluded indirect shareholders.
The reported liquidity and pooling cost estimates are expected to be lower bounds of the true costs for three reasons. First, the estimation process excludes liquidity cost components such as tracking error and taxes. Second, the estimates are based on two very coarse types of shareholders|indirect and direct|that are categorized by just one ex ante characteristic. It is easy to segment further the shareholders into groups that have larger costs. Third, the estimates ignore shareholders' private information about their liquidity needs.
VI. Discussion
The¯rst part of this study documents that shareholders in one mutual fund family have predictably di®erent liquidity needs. The second part shows that the shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is not proportional to the costs they pay in the fund. This raises three questions about the predictable wealth transfer: can it be reduced or eliminated, is it o®set by other costs, and does it exist in other mutual fund families? These are discussed in turn.
A. Reducing the Wealth Transfer
The wealth transfer could be reduced if fees were charged that either discouraged costly, short-term investments or compensated the fund for its transaction costs. One common fee is the load. It is generally imposed by the fund at the time of share purchase (front-end load), but it is occasionally imposed at the time of redemption (back-end load). Either way, the load introduces, in e®ect, a bid-ask spread in the pricing of fund shares that makes trading more costly for shareholders. Nevertheless, loads may not have a large e®ect on fund-level investment horizons because they are generally family (and not fund) speci¯c. For example, a new shareholder will pay a load on the initial investment in an equity fund but not on a subsequent exchange to another equity fund in the same family. Moreover, loads are paid to the broker and do not compensate the fund for its transaction costs.
Some funds charge purchase or redemption fees that are paid directly to the fund's portfolio|not to the broker|to o®set the fund's trading expenses. Purchase fees are imposed on all share purchases; redemption fees are only levied against shares sold within a speci¯ed time after purchase, typically fewer than three months. These fees should reduce the transaction cost externality because they may discourage very short holding periods and they compensate the fund for at least some of the shareholder-imposed transaction costs.
Even when combined, however, purchase and redemption fees will not eliminate the wealth transfer because shareholders whose investment horizon exceeds the redemption-fee window do not pay the redemption fee.
The percent of no-load equity funds that impose redemption fees increased from 3.5% in 1999 to 7.7% in
2001.
14 In theory, the transaction cost externality would be eliminated were every shareholder charged, irrespective of expected or realized holding periods, a properly calibrated transaction fee for all purchases and redemptions that is paid directly to the fund's portfolio. However, transaction fees would not address the other four liquidity costs (such as taxes) highlighted in Section V.
B. O®setting Costs
It may be naÄ ³ve to focus on just one cost of investing in mutual funds when it might be o®set by other factors. For example, there may be economies of scale in the industry that reduce expense ratios as the fund grows. If the expense ratio reduction were large enough, short-term shareholders would provide a net bene¯t to long-term shareholders when they join the fund.
Another unexplored cost comes from servicing shareholders. The Vanguard Group says that shareholder servicing costs are approximately $40 per account per year. 15 A fund's expense ratio would have to include 25 100 bp on a $4,000 account to recover just these expenses. Even if long-term accounts subsidize short-term accounts' trading costs, the wealth transfer likely runs the other way for shareholder servicing costs because long-term accounts tend to carry small balances.
C. Generalizability
The predictable wealth transfers documented within one mutual fund family are more interesting if they are indicative of economically signi¯cant wealth transfers in other mutual fund families. The remainder of this section discusses, therefore, whether shareholders in other funds have predictably heterogeneous liquidity needs and whether other funds have di®erent liquidity costs.
The transfer agent that provided data for this study anecdotally reports that this family's shareholders are more stable (longer term) than those in other families it services. Beyond this, it is impossible to say whether shareholders in other mutual funds have liquidity needs that are di®erent from those documented in this study. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conjecture that other funds contain shareholders with heterogeneous expected investment horizons because fund shares are frequently sold through multiple distribution channels.
For example, some funds are distributed through both small 401(k) retirement plans that do not provide many alternative investments and large mutual fund supermarkets that do. Even if a particular fund were distributed through a single channel|such as a proprietary pension fund for a large employer|investors may have unequal access to account options such as Internet trading privileges that a®ect or are a®ected by their switching costs. For example, white-collar managers with computers on their desks and Internet trading privileges trade shares more cheaply than blue-collar workers on the factory°oor without computer access trade. Although this sort of within-fund heterogeneity is expected to lead to measurable ex ante investment horizon di®erences within other mutual funds, it is unclear whether the average di®erence will be smaller or larger than those documented in this study.
The reported liquidity cost estimates may be representative of the average costs found in other funds because they are grounded in general results from Edelen (1999) and Jones and Lipson (2001) . On a fundby-fund basis, however, it is clear that shareholder-imposed costs vary. A few examples illustrate which funds might have high liquidity costs. First, shareholder°ows increase costs if they are volatile (as might be the case in mutual fund supermarkets) or if they are large relative to the size of the fund (as might be the case in a small fund that has gotten positive press). Second, the fund accentuates the negative e®ect of shareholder°ow if it accumulates°ows over short periods (as might be the case in a fund that is sensitive to deviations from its preferred portfolio weights). Last, the fund's costs will increase if the fund aggressively trades assets (as might be the case in a momentum fund) or if the fund trades relatively illiquid assets (as might be the case in a small-cap fund).
VII. Conclusion
A new friction in trading mutual fund shares is proposed: switching costs. Shareholders with low switching costs sell fund shares early and impose high costs on the fund. Similarly, shareholders with high switching costs sell fund shares late and impose low costs on the fund. The net e®ect is a wealth transfer from the long-term shareholders to the short-term shareholders. Two implications of the model are tested in this study: switching-cost di®erences are associated with investment horizon di®erences and investment horizon di®erences cause a wealth transfer among shareholders.
The¯rst half of the analysis shows that the fund can predict shareholders' investment horizons using data it collects in the ordinary course of business that proxy for shareholders' switching costs. For example, older investors, larger accounts, and Fund/SERV accounts have shorter investment horizons while automatic investment plan, tax-advantaged, and employee accounts have longer investment horizons. Accounts with recent purchases are less likely than others to close; those with recent redemptions are more likely than others to close. Accounts with distant purchases or redemptions are uniformly more likely than others to close, but the distant-purchase e®ect is economically small. The evidence also shows that even though various measures of fund returns are statistically signi¯cant predictors of investment horizons, the economic e®ects are surprisingly small.
The duration analysis also shows that residents of the investment advisor's home state have predictably 27 longer investment horizons than non-resident shareholders have. This large e®ect is interesting in light of the geography literature that documents investors' preference for local assets (for example, French and Poterba (1991) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) ).
The second half of the analysis splits the shareholders into two groups based on the channel through which they purchased fund shares and measures the liquidity demands of each group. Estimates show that even though the indirect and direct shareholders bear the same liquidity costs in the pooled fund, their liquidity needs di®er signi¯cantly. In other words, the shareholders' predicted demand for liquidity is not proportional to the costs they bear in the fund, suggesting that the fund systematically misprices its shares.
For example, expected long-term shareholders pay more for liquidity in the pooled fund than they would pay if the fund excluded expected short-term shareholders.
The levels of the reported cost estimates are large relative to explicit mutual fund expenses such as management fees and 12b-1 fees. Moreover, the simulations likely underestimate the true pooling externalities for two reasons. First, this study only looks at one dimension of the problem, ignoring, for example, the e®ects of taxes and tracking error. Second, the cost estimates are based on only two ex ante types of shareholders, neglecting not only the shareholders' private information about their liquidity needs, but also many other observable variables that predict account closures.
An important result of this article is that mutual funds are not Diamond-Dybvig liquidity providers that o®er an equitable insurance bene¯t to all shareholders. Because predictable investment horizon di®erences result in economically signi¯cant wealth transfers, the fund's proportionate allocation of costs allows expected short-term shareholders to impose some of their costs on the long-term shareholder. Future research could pursue this unexpected wealth transfer from the supply side: why do mutual funds pool predictably heterogeneous shareholders? Alternatively, the demand side could be explored: why do long-term investors commit resources to mutual funds that engage in such pooling? Although these questions are narrowly focused on mutual funds, parallel questions may apply to banks, mortgage-backed securities, and other¯-nancial structures. Answers to these questions may add important insights into the perennial question of how mutual funds and related¯nancial intermediaries add value.
second phases. Shareholder°ows reduce, therefore, the fund's after-cost performance for both redeemers and non-redeemers.
Theorem 1 shows that if switching costs are large enough for the high-cost type, there is a separating equilibrium where the low-switching-cost (LSC) investors switch funds at midlife and the high-switching-cost (HSC) investors do not switch funds. The HSC investors recognize the LSC investors earn a higher return than they do in this full-information game, but they refrain from trade because their switching cost is at least as large as the trading gain.
Theorem 1 (Separating Equilibrium)
If µ 2 (0; 1) and s h¸1 ¡µ 1+µ
c, investors with high switching costs invest for both periods in the new fund while investors with low switching costs invest in the new fund for only one period, switching to the future fund at midlife. The¯rst-period fund return is, therefore, R ¡ 2µ 1+µ c and the second-period fund return is R ¡ c. The traders' return
1+µ c´2 is greater than the non-traders' return
Proof. At time t, assume the LSC investors¯nd it optimal to switch while the HSC investors do not. In this case, the new fund acquires the entire new generation of investors (1) and all shareholders from the old fund who have low switching costs (µ). The new fund has, therefore, 1 + µ investors at t, 2µ of whom redeem at t + 1 when the older µ die and the younger µ switch to the future fund. The remaining 1 ¡ µ HSC investors continue in the fund until it is liquidated at t + 2. The total trading cost at t + 1 is 2µc, and the per-investor cost is 2µ 1+µ c. The¯rst-period fund return is, therefore, R ¡ 2µ 1+µ c. At t + 2, the total trading cost is (1 ¡ µ)c, and the per-investor cost is c. The second-period fund return is, therefore, R ¡ c. Given these fund returns and investing strategies, do any investors deviate? For the LSC investor, the equilibrium return is ³ R ¡ 2µ 1+µ c´2 while the best deviating return is (R ¡ Theorem 2 demonstrates there is no pooling equilibrium in this economy.
Theorem 2 (Pooling Equilibrium)
There is no pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Assume no investor switches at midlife. The return from not deviating is R(R ¡ c) while the return from deviating is (R ¡ s)R. In this case, at least the LSC investors deviate because s l = 0. Assume all investors switch at midlife. The return from not deviating is (R¡c¡s)(R¡c) while the return from deviating is (R ¡ c)(R ¡ c). Thus, the HSC investors deviate because s h > 0.
The before-trade fund return is always R. Because trades generate no social bene¯ts and are costly, they are a deadweight loss to the economy. Theorem 3 proves this, showing that a social planner would prohibit midlife trades.
Theorem 3 (Social Welfare) Midlife trades are a deadweight loss to the economy in the separating equilibrium.
Proof. Assume the separating equilibrium where trades generate gains for the LSC investors and losses for the HSC investor. The aggregate bene¯t and cost of the midlife trades are as follows:
The di®erence between the bene¯ts and costs is aggregate bene¯t -aggregate cost =
since µ 2 (0; 1) and c < 1 2
R.
Were funds to price redemptions according to marginal cost, each investor would pay c for each redemption. However, the actual pricing structure in the model permits a wealth transfer in the separating equilibrium: twice redeemers pay shows that if µ were large enough, even the traders who exploit the pricing mechanism would prefer marginal cost pricing to the prisoner's-dilemma-like payo®s they receive in the separating equilibrium. The essential intuition is that with enough traders in the economy, their lifetime return
2 is less than the return they receive if midlife trades are prohibited R(R ¡ c).
Theorem 4 (Trading Tax) Assume µ 2 (0; 1) and c 2 (0;
. If µ 2 [V; 1), a midlife trading tax p¸c is Pareto optimal. If µ 2 (0; V ), a midlife trading tax p¸c bene¯ts the HSC investors but hurts the LSC investors.
Proof. If no one trades, then all investors receive the two-period return R(R ¡ c). The LSC investors' return from deviating is (R ¡ p)R, so they do not deviate. The HSC investors' return from deviating is even lower so they, too, do not deviate. All that remains to be shown is that this new pooling equilibrium is Pareto improving. The HSC investors' welfare clearly improves. The LSC investors are no worse o® if
, where V 0 < V .
The¯rst root, V 0 , is negative because c 2 (0; 1 2 R). The second root, V , is between zero and one for the same reason. Therefore, f(µ) is negative when µ 2 (0; V ) and non-negative when µ 2 [V; 1).
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6 The Fund/SERV system is a technology provided by the National Securities Clearing Corporation that included 571 fund families in September 2001. Investors connected to this network are able to trade funds in a supermarket-like fashion at low¯nancial and economic cost. A list of Fund/SERV participants is available at http://www.nscc.com/directory/fundserv.pdf. 7 The intermediary that brings investors to the fund can establish one of three bookkeeping arrangements with the transfer agent. First, an omnibus account can be created that contains all shareholders of the intermediary in the fund. In this case, the transfer agent has on its books one (large) account that is permitted to trade frequently in the fund. Large mutual fund supermarkets such as Charles Schwab or TD Waterhouse may choose this system. In the second arrangement, intermediaries open accounts for each of their individual investors using the intermediaries' name and a control number. Brokers such as E*TRADE and HARRISdirect may choose this system. Under either of these schemes, the transfer agent does not know the identity of the ultimate investor, although in the second case it is able to observe the investor's trades. In the¯nal bookkeeping arrangement, each account is identi¯ed by its shareholder.
8 In other contexts, studies have shown that aggregate fund°ows are not particularly sensitive to the chosen measure of fund performance (Gruber (1996) , Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Zheng (1999) ). The present research weights accounts equally (as opposed to weighting by account value), and Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) document that mutual fund shareholders are unexpectedly unsophisticated. It seems unlikely that sophisticated measures of fund return would explain account durations better than simple ones. Because no noteworthy di®erences are found across several speci¯cations, a simple measure is reported.
9 If indirect and direct shareholders really trade shares di®erently, the fund may adapt its response to shareholder°ows. In the gross-°ow model, for example, this suggests that¯d irect 6 =¯i ndirect . Data limitations prevent an exploration of this issue; the estimated costs assume that the fund's response does not vary by shareholder type.
costs are 68 bp.
11 January 2001 Morningstar PrincipiaPro; author's calculations.
12 It is unlikely the fund accumulates°ows over periods longer than one calendar month. First, the transfer agent sends the fund daily or twice-daily updates on gross shareholder°ows. This suggests that the fund considers daily whether or not to trade shareholder°ow. Second, the ratio of monthly net°ows to monthly fund assets averages 7%. Tracking error would be signi¯cant if the fund had longer accumulation periods. 13 The referee kindly suggested this approach. 16 Investor heterogeneity is modeled in terms of switching costs. Other devices that generate similar results include search costs (some investors are better or more cheaply informed about alternative funds), trading preferences (some agents like to trade), and taxes (some investors are not required to pay taxes on early redemptions). 
Closure Risk Estimated at Account Opening
The semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model,¸(t; z;¯;¸0) = e z 0¯¸0 (t), is applied to all equity accounts that were opened between fall 1994 and summer 2000 in one anonymous mutual fund family. The¯rst, opening trade in the account is event-time zero. The closure of the account is observed if it occurs before summer 2000; otherwise, it is censored. The baseline hazard¸0 is left unspeci¯ed and corresponds to z = 0. The baseline account is characterized by a shareholder who is between 40 and 50 years old, is not an employee of the investment advisor, does not live in one of the seven°agged states, does not participate in an automatic investment plan, does not allow telephone trading, and opened the account with the fund's minimum required investment using a check through the Retail Taxable distribution channel. Only data collected by the fund when the account is opened are used to estimate the account's closure risk. All variables are dichotomous. The unreported controls include fund dummies, month dummies (69; December 1994 is omitted), calendar-month dummies (12; November is omitted), day-of-week dummies (5; Monday is omitted), and six dummies that capture whether the fund exceeded its benchmark index or an alternative index at account opening over the previous week, month, or quarter. The estimated hazard ratios (HR) and robust standard errors (RSE) are displayed for three speci¯cations. Statistical signi¯cance at ten,¯ve, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. The variables are de¯ned in 
De¯nitions of Variables Collected after Account Opening
De¯nes the variables collected by the fund after account opening. The trade variables are dichotomous, and the return variables are continuous.
Recent-trade dummies
Recent Buy there was a non-automatic purchase in the previous 30-day interval Recent Sell there was a non-automatic redemption in the previous 30-day interval Ever-trade dummies Ever Buy there was a non-automatic purchase before the current 30-day interval Ever Sell there was a non-automatic redemption before the current 30-day interval
Fund returns Fund Return Lag 1 di®erence between the annualized lagged fund return and the annualized average fund return Fund Return Lag 2 di®erence between the annualized twice-lagged fund return and the annualized average fund return Account returns Account Return di®erence between the annualized account's lifetime return and the annualized average fund return 
Summary Statistics of Variables Collected after Account Opening
Presents the means and standard deviations of the after-opening trading dummies for the database that consists of all equity accounts opened between fall 1994 and summer 2000 in one anonymous mutual fund family. Each account is split into 30-day observations. For a given account, the trading dummies start at zero but become one later if there is an appropriate trade in the account. There are approximately one and a half million observations (i.e., account months) in the database. 
Closure Risk Estimated after Account Opening
The semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model,¸(t; z;¯;¸0) = e z 0¯¸0 (t), is estimated for all equity accounts that were opened between fall 1994 and summer 2000 in one anonymous mutual fund family. The¯rst, opening trade in the account is event-time zero. The closure of the account is observed if it occurs before summer 2000; otherwise, it is censored. The baseline hazard¸0 is left unspeci¯ed and corresponds to z = 0. The baseline account is characterized by a shareholder who is between 40 and 50 years old, is not an employee of the investment advisor, does not live in one of the seven°agged states, does not participate in an automatic investment plan, does not allow telephone trading, and opened the account with the fund's minimum required investment using a check through the Retail Taxable distribution channel. The regression includes data that are collected by the fund on the day the account is opened (i.e., every regressor from the third speci¯cation of Table IV ) and data that are collected after account opening (including fund returns, account returns, shareholder trades, and dummies that capture more robust time e®ects). The estimated hazard ratios (HR) and non-robust standard errors (NRSE) are displayed for four speci¯cations. Statistical signi¯cance at ten,¯ve, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. The variables are de¯ned in Tables I and V. 
